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How does foreign competition affect growth and innovation in China? Using our unique 
measures of proximity of Chinese firms and industries to the world technology frontier, we 
find that despite vast sectoral heterogeneity, Chinese manufacturing industries have 
undergone rapid technological upgrading over the period of 2000-06. The distance to the 
world production frontier of firms and industries also play a significant role in shaping the 
nexus between the competition pressure from foreign imports and domestic firms’ growth and 
innovation behavior. Our results support the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al. (2005) 
that import competition stimulates domestic firms’ productivity growth and R&D expenditure 
if firms and their industries are close to the world frontier, but discourages such incentives for 
laggard firms and industries. The two forces highlighted by the model operate for imports 
under the ordinary-trade regime, for collective and private firms, and for imports originated 
from high-income countries. Our findings are robust after controlling for the influence of 
foreign investment, the reverse causality of regressors and the short-term business cycle 
fluctuations.   
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International trade is widely viewed as a major driver for China’s remarkable economic 
growth since the start of economic reform (see, Song et al., 2011; Knight and Ding, 2012). 
However, there is no consensus on whether the exposure to trade openness has stimulated the 
innovation incentives of domestic firms and therefore enhances their productivity. For 
instance, China has long been regarded as the world factory that produces cheap but inferior 
quality products whereas Chinese firms are considered as fast followers rather than leaders in 
terms of technology. This seems to be consistent with the predictions of the traditional 
Heckscher-Ohlin theory that countries that are abundant in labor ought to produce and export 
labor-intensive goods such as toys and apparel. On the other hand, both Rodrik (2006) and 
Schott (2008) find that China’s export bundle is significantly more sophisticated than its 
income level would dictate, which cannot be entirely explained by factor endowments. There 
is also some recent evidence showing that China is moving up the technological curve in 
many sophisticated areas (such as the telecommunication equipment sector) and becoming a 
new innovation powerhouse with its share of the world’s high-technology manufacturing 
spiraled from 8% in 2003 to 24% in 2012. Such striking trend corresponds well to the 
paradigm shift of national innovation policy towards indigenous innovation1 with more focus 
on domestic firms since 2005.   
In this paper, we explore two interesting but related research questions. First, is there 
any technological upgrading of Chinese manufacturing firms and industries so that they are 
catching up the world technology frontier? Second, has the increased exposure to foreign 
competition through imports generated productivity gains and fostered innovation behavior 
within the Chinese manufacturing sector? The latter can be extended to a much broader 
research question: how does the import competition affect growth and innovation in China? 
The novelty and contribution of our research lie in the following four aspects. 
First, despite a growing literature on China’s trade pattern, most research focuses on 
the impact of exports on Chinese economy or the competition effect of Chinese imports to 
other developed and developing countries (see, Bloom et al., 2011; Jarreau and Poncet, 2012; 
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 The indigenous innovation is defined as ‘enhancing original innovation through co-innovation and re-
innovation based on the assimilation of imported technologies’ in a State Council document titled by ‘The 
outline plan of medium and long-term science and technology development 2006-2020’. 
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Iacovone et al., 2013; Mion and Zhu, 2013; and Bloom et al., 2014) 2 . The important 
economic and policy implications of imports are thus largely ignored in the literature. For 
instance, imports may represent an important channel of international technology transfer, 
which can stimulate the development of industrial technology in related domestic industries 
through vertical linkage effects. We tend to fill this gap in the literature by focusing on the 
effect of competition pressure brought by imports on domestic firms’ productivity and 
innovation behavior in China.  
Second, we distinguish the heterogeneous effects of import competition on firms’ 
productivity growth according to their distance to the world technology frontier. We 
hypothesize that tough foreign competition may induce the productivity improvement of 
domestic firms which are close to the technology frontier by strengthening their incentives to 
innovate in order to match the foreign competition; on the contrary, it may reduce firms’ 
incentive to innovate and therefore their productivity growth if firms are further behind the 
frontier as their chance to survive the new competition is limited. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first in the literature to allow the relationship between import 
competition and productivity growth in China to depend on the proximity of the firm and 
industry to the world production frontier.   
Third, we take into account a number of China-specific factors (such as the regional 
marketization status) when applying the distance-to-frontier model to explain the nexus 
between foreign competition and firm-level productivity growth. Moreover, we estimate the 
model for different ownership groups in order to explore whether some minimum 
institutional quality is required for the mechanisms of the model to operate as suggested by 
Acemoglu et al. (2006) and Amiti and Khandelwal (2013). Our results show that this is 
important given the presence of multi-dimensional sources of market frictions in China.    
Fourth, we examine the trade-induced innovation hypothesis developed by Bloom et 
al. (2014) by distinguishing the origin of imports according to countries’ income level. Our 
                                                        
2
 For instance, Jarreau and Poncet (2012) claim that export sophistication matters for China’s growth and the 
growth gains from improved technology only link with domestic-owned firms and with ordinary trade. Iacovone 
et al. (2013) explore the effect of surge in import competition from China on Mexican manufacturing firms, and 
find that this shock causes a significant market share reallocation within firms and between firms. Mion and Zhu 
(2013) find evidence that import competition from China reduces firms’ employment growth and induces 
substantial skill upgrading in low-tech manufacturing industries in Belgium. Bloom et al. (2014) develop a 
‘trapped factor’ model to explain the effect of competition from low-wage imports (such as China) on European 
firms, i.e. rising Chinese import competition leads to more innovation and resource reallocation towards more 
innovative and  technologically advanced firms in Europe, as found in Bloom et al. (2011).  
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results indicate that there is a different mechanism working for China as the trapped factor 
model is originally developed for firms in advanced economies. To the best of our 
knowledge, we are the first to engage with this strand of literature when examining the 
impact of import competition in China.    
Using a number of comprehensive micro-economic datasets, we find that despite vast 
sectoral heterogeneity, Chinese manufacturing industries have undergone rapid technological 
upgrading and converged quickly to the world production frontier over the period of 2000-06. 
Consistent with the theoretical predictions of Aghion et al. (2005), import competition spurs 
domestic firms’ productivity growth and R&D expenditure if firms or their industries are 
close to the world frontier, but discourages such incentives for firms and industries which are 
far from the frontier. The two separation forces operate well for the ordinary-trade imports 
but not for the processing-trade imports. When estimating the model for various ownerships, 
both effects are evident for domestic collective and private firms, but not for the state sector 
or the foreign sector. We also find that import competition from high-income countries plays 
a major role in driving the productivity and innovation wedge among domestic firms and 
industries. Our findings remain intact when another source of foreign competition (i.e. 
foreign direct investment, FDI thereafter) is controlled for and when the business cycle 
effects are removed. We adopt both the two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach and the 
system GMM estimator to deal with the potential endogeneity. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 addresses some background information on 
China’s trade pattern and ownership reforms, with a focus on the role of imports. Section 4 
explains our empirical model specification and hypotheses. Section 5 discusses the data and 
sample and presents some basic summary statistics. Section 6 interprets the results of our 
baseline model estimation and of various robustness checks. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Related literature: theory and evidence 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Our paper relates closely to at least two strands of interrelated literature in economic 
theory, i.e. the macroeconomic endogenous growth model and the industrial organization 
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literature that analyzes product market competition and innovation. For instance, the 
endogenous growth model considers the process of learning and the adoption of new 
technologies as being costly; policies such as encouraging technological learning and 
technology imports may lead to higher growth rates. In particular, according to Schumpeter’s 
appropriability argument (1943), the product-market competition is essential to the growth 
process, and competition reduces growth by reducing monopoly profits that reward 
innovation. Thus, the Schumpeterian theory predicts a linear and negative relationship 
between competition and innovation or economic growth. 
This argument is challenged by Aghion et al. (2005) which claims that there is a non-
monotonic nexus between competition and innovation. Their theory is motivated by the 
evidence of a clear inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation using panel 
data, illustrated by Figure 1, which plots patents against the Lerner index. Their explanation 
for the inverted-U shape hinges critically on the incumbent’s position relative to the world 
technology frontier, i.e. increasing competition stimulates innovative activity for firms at the 
technology frontier but reduces innovation if the firms are far from the frontier.  
The basic intuition behind the distance-to-frontier model is as follows. The innovation 
incentives of incumbent firms are affected by the difference between their post-innovation 
and pre-innovation rents. On the one hand, for firms close to the technology frontier, 
competition can increase their incentives to innovate because it reduces firms’ pre-innovation 
rents by more than it reduces their post-innovation rents. In other words, competition may 
increase the incremental profits from innovating for the incumbent leaders, and thereby 
encourage their R&D investments aiming at escaping the threat of competition. This force is 
referred to as the ‘escape-competition effect’. On the other hand, for firms far from the 
technology frontier, an increase in competition may reduce their incentives to innovate 
because ex post rents from innovation are eroded by new entrants, as in Schumpeter’s 
appropriability argument. This is because in such sectors where innovations are made by 
laggard firms with already low initial profits, the product market competition will mainly 
affect the post-innovation rents. Thus, firms far from the frontier know that they cannot 
survive increased competition even if they successfully innovate. As a result, any policies that 
promote competition will discourage these laggard firms from spending resources on 
innovation. This leads to the ‘discouragement effect’. In brief, the implications of the model 
are that the relationship between innovation and competition depends, in a non-monotonic 
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way, on firms’ distance to the world technology frontier as follows.  
             𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑓(𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑟)                         (1) 
Lastly, the theoretical literature on appropriate technology might also be relevant. 
Acemoglu (2002) advocates the idea of directed technological change and argues that 
technologies developed in industrialized countries may not be appropriate for developing 
countries whose factor endowments and socio-economic conditions are significantly different 
from those in developed economies. A similar idea in the trade literature is that although trade 
liberalization facilitates procurement of foreign technology, it is not clear whether domestic 
firms are able to adopt foreign technology. Eaton and Kortum (1996) argue that the impact of 
knowledge diffusion on productivity depends crucially on the proximity of a country to the 
technology source and the flexibility of the domestic labor force. 
2.2 Empirical evidence on the distance-to-frontier model 
The distance-to-frontier theory is well supported by both the macroeconomic and 
microeconomic empirical evidence. For instance, based on the cross-country data for the 
years 1974-1990, Acemoglu et al. (2006) distinguish the growth effect of innovation 
according to countries’ distance to world technology frontier and find that innovation become 
more important as economies approach to the world technology frontier. They argue that 
barriers to competition should have limited costs when countries are far from the world 
technology frontier but should become much more costly near the frontier.  
Using a rich panel of over 5,000 UK incumbent establishments in 180 4-digit 
industries over the period 1987-1993, Aghion et al. (2009) find evidence that the threat of 
technologically-advanced foreign entry spurs innovation incentives in sectors close to the 
technology frontier, where successful innovation allows incumbents to survive the threat, but 
discourages innovation in laggard sectors, where the threat reduces incumbents’ expected 
rents from innovating. The causal effect proves to be robust when entry is instrumented by 
policy variables and when domestic entry and entry through imports are controlled for.   
Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) analyze the effect of import competition on quality 
upgrading using highly disaggregated data on exports to the US from 56 countries in 10,000 
products.  They allow the relationship between tariffs and quality upgrading to depend on the 
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proximity of the product to the world quality frontier and find strong evidence in support of 
the non-monotonic relationship, i.e. lower import tariffs promote quality upgrading of 
products that are initially close to the world technology frontier, but discourage quality 
upgrading of products that are distant from the world frontier.   
2.3 Empirical evidence on the effect of import competition on Chinese firms 
Our work connects closely to the recent empirical literature on the effect of trade 
liberalization, which suggests that trade can have a large positive impact on innovation and 
productivity3. In comparison with the well-established cross-country evidence, the work on 
China is rather limited. One outstanding exception is Yu (2014) which examines the effect of 
tariff reduction on imported inputs and final goods on firm productivity. He considers the 
special tariff treatment that processing firms receive on imported inputs and constructs the 
firm-specific input and output tariffs. He finds that both types of tariff reductions have 
positive impacts on firm productivity, but the effect is weaker as firms’ processing import 
share grows. However, none of the existing work takes into account firms’ position relative to 
the world technology frontier when examining the trade liberalization effect in China, which 
leaves room for our study. 
3. China background  
3.1 Trade liberalization and import competition in China 
China began trade liberalization with one of the most closed economies in the world, 
whose total trade over GDP ratio was marginally above 10 percent in 1978. With its open 
door policy, China's degree of integration into the world economy has improved dramatically. 
As shown in Figure 2, both exports and imports climbed strongly and persistently over the 
past three decades, and in 2013 China surpassed US as world's largest trading nation as 
measured by the sum of exports and imports. Regarding the role of imports, the country’s 
import penetration ratio4 rose from 5% in 1978 to a peak of 31% in 2006 and stabilized 
around 24% afterwards. The high and rising aggregate import penetration ratio reflects the 
                                                        
3
 See for instance Pavcnik (2002) on Chile, Bernard et al. (2006) on the US, Amiti and Konings (2007) on 
Indonesia, Fernandes (2007) on Colombia, Aw et al. (2011) on Taiwan, Topalova and Kandelwal (2011) on 
India; and Bustos (2011) on Argentina. 
4
 Import penetration ratio expresses imports as a percentage of domestic supply, which is GDP minus exports 
plus imports. It reflects the relative share of imports in the supply of goods available for domestic consumption. 
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important but often-ignored role of imports in promoting competition and providing lowest-
cost supplies in the Chinese economy5. 
Another feature of China’s trade pattern is the sheer magnitude of processing trade6. 
According to Yu (2014), processing imports account for more than 50% of China’s total 
imports. However, it is interesting to see in Figure 3 that although the share of processing 
imports dominates that of ordinary imports in the 1990s, the importance of processing 
imports declines over time with a dramatic fall after 2005. In 2013, processing imports 
account for merely 25% of total imports in China whereas the corresponding figure for 
ordinary imports is 57%. The fact that processing trade becomes less prevalent recently can 
be explained by a series of policy tightening on processing trade together with the rising labor 
costs in China7.  
Lastly, Figure 4 shows that the majority of China’s imports are from high-income 
countries8, which accounts for on average 95% of total imports in China over the period of 
1998-2013. The average import penetration ratio from high-income countries (22.3%) is 
more than 17 times than that of low-income countries (1.3%). There is some declining trend 
of high-income-country import share from 98% in 1998 to 93% in 2013, which may reflect 
China’s policy towards trade diversification by expanding its trade partners in developing and 
emerging markets9.       
3.2 Ownership reforms in China 
One distinguishing feature of China’s institutional reform is the emergence of new 
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 The information on industry-level import penetration ratio is available in the Online Appendix 1.  
6
 Processing trade is officially defined as business activities in which the operating enterprise imports all or part 
of the raw or ancillary materials, spare parts, components, and packaging materials, and re-exports finished 
products after processing or assembling these materials/parts (Manova and Yu, 2012).  
7
 China has revised and tightened its policy on export tax rebate in 1994, 1996, 1997, 2002, 2003, and 2004 
since its first introduction in 1985; in 2006, China started to restrict exports of high-energy-consumption, high 
pollution and resource-based products; and in 2007, China published a catalogue of products restricted from 
processing trade. All these policy shifts indicate the signal of tightening processing trade by Chinese 
government. 
8
 The high- and low-income country classification is made by comparing the GDP per capita in 2000 (constant 
2005 US$, data from World Development Indicator) between China and other countries, i.e. countries with GDP 
per capita higher than China are referred to as high-income countries, and those with GDP per capita lower than 
China are referred to as low-income countries; the import penetration ratio is then computed for these two 
groups of countries. China’s major importers include the European Union, US, South Korea, Canada, Australia, 
and Taiwai etc. 
9
 For instance, China has been actively exploring trade opportunities in these markets through bilateral and free 
trade agreements (FTAs) with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Pakistan, India, Chile, 
Peru, and Costa Rica etc since 2002.  
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forms of ownership. The Chinese industrial sector was initially dominated by state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), whose directive was to fulfill production quotas, to transfer profits to 
government, and to provide life-long employment. Then collective and private firms began to 
grow rapidly in the 1980s and 1990s, who played a catalytic role in pushing China towards a 
market economy. Unlike SOEs, collective and private firms faced relatively hard budget 
constraints, so generating profit incentives. Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Southern Tour’ in the spring of 
1992 unleashed a surge of inward FDI to China, and foreign firms have been allowed steadily 
greater freedom to operate in the Chinese market. The Company Law adopted in 1994 
provided a uniform legal framework into which all of the ownership forms fit, signaling the 
introduction of more clearly defined property rights and the start of the dramatic institutional 
change involved in the rapid downsizing of the state sector. Many SOEs and collective firms 
were shut down, privatized or turned into shareholding entities that are increasingly 
dominated by private owners. However, SOEs remain dominant in energy, natural resources 
and a few strategic or monopolistic sectors that are controlled and protected by central and 
local governments. Despite some evidence that the profitability of the state sector improved 
after 1998, SOEs are generally still less efficient than non-state firms (Ding et al., 2012). 
Figure 5 illustrates the evolvement of China’s imports by different ownership groups 
since 199510. It is interesting to see that the majority of China’s imports are carried out by 
foreign firms due to the massive FDI inflows to China, i.e. on average imports by foreign 
firms account for more than 53% of total imports in China. But the ratio began to shrink from 
its peak of 60% in 2006 to 45% in 2013, corresponding to the recent policy shift away from 
processing trade. Over the entire sample period, imports by private firms climbed strongly 
and persistently from merely 3% in 1995 to 30% in 2013; on the contrary, the SOE imports 
declined dramatically from 50% in 1995 to 25% in 2013. This contrasting trend reflects well 
the increasing role of private sector and the decreasing role of state sector in the Chinese 
economy.  
Thus, our preliminary data observation shows that import competition is high and 
rising in China; processing imports are important but its role has declined over time; most 
imports to China are originated from high-income countries; and lastly, while foreign firms 
are the main importers, more and more domestic private firms are engaging with import 
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 The annual data is aggregated from the monthly report of China Customs Statistics, where only three types of 
ownerships (SOEs, private firms and foreign firms) are reported, i.e. there is no information for collective firms 
given its small and diminishing size in the economy.  
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business in China.  
4. Our methodology  
4.1 The hypotheses and our proxies for distance 
Following the discussion of the distance-to-frontier theory, we examine the 
heterogeneous effects of import competition on productivity improvement and innovation 
behavior of domestic firms. We hypothesize that foreign competition through imports does 
not necessarily increase the productivity of all domestic manufacturing firms in China, i.e. the 
relationship depends on the proximity to technology frontier of firms and industries due to the 
two forces discussed earlier. A caveat is in order: unlike firms in the advanced economies 
which hope to escape competition through innovation, the technology upgrading behavior of 
Chinese firms is mainly driven by a wish to stay in the game in the face of rising foreign 
competition. Therefore, the escape-competition effect may not be appropriate for China, and 
we would like to use the ‘matching-competition effect’ instead11.  
In this paper, we are interested in examining the following two effects. 
o The industry effect: increasing import competition has a more positive effect on 
firms’ productivity growth in sectors that are close to the frontier than in sectors 
further behind the frontier. 
o The firm effect: in each industrial sector, import penetration induces firms that 
are close to the technology frontier to innovate more and to improve 
productivity, but reduces such incentives if firms are distant from the frontier. 
To test these hypotheses, we construct two alternative proxies for the distance to the 
technology frontier. First, the industry-distance-to-frontier (𝐼𝐷𝐹) measure relates the labor 
productivity of 374 4-digit Chinese manufacturing industries to their US industry equivalents, 
where the US industries are used to represent the world technology frontier. Following 
Aghion et al. (2009), we compute the industry distance measure by using the 3-year moving 
average of US industry labor productivity relative to labor productivity in the respective 
Chinese industry as follows:  
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 We thank one anonymous referee for raising this point. 
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                                                                 (2) 
where 𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑝𝑡  is the distance of industry j in province p in China at time t relative to its 
technology frontier;  𝐿𝑃𝑗𝑝𝑡 is the labor productivity (defined as the value added per worker) 
of industry j in province p in China at time t; and 𝐿𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑈𝑆 is the labor productivity of industry j 
in the US. For each time period t, we average over the current and the two proceeding years 
in order to alleviate the business cycle effects and potential measurement errors12.  
Similarly, the firm-distance-to-frontier (𝐹𝐷𝐹) measure is defined as the 3-year moving 
average of US industry labor productivity relative to labor productivity of firms in the 
respective Chinese industry as follows: 




                                                           (3) 
where 𝐹𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the distance of firm i in industry j at time t relative to its technology frontier; 
𝐿𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the labor productivity of firm i in industry j at time t; and 𝐿𝑃𝑗𝑡
𝑈𝑆  is the labor 
productivity of industry j in the US. For both 𝐼𝐷𝐹 and 𝐹𝐷𝐹, the bigger the value of distance 
measure is, the further the Chinese industry or firm is away from the technology frontier in 
the US. 
4.2 Baseline model specification  
Our baseline model is specified as follows: 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼2𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑡 + 𝜃𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡 + 𝜉𝑖 + 𝜁𝑗 + 𝜍𝑝 + 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡     (4) 
where the dependent variable 𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a measure of growth or innovation performance of firm 𝑖 
in industry 𝑗  at time 𝑡 , which takes the form of either the TFP growth 13  or the natural 
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 The distance variable is constructed based on the NBS data, which is available for the period of 1998-2007. 
Thus, we are able to compute the 3-year average for all the years of our merged dataset ranging from 2000-06.  
13
 Our measure of firm-level TFP is constructed using the semi-parametric Olley and Pakes (1996) approach. 
See Online Appendix 2 for detailed methodology and results. 
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logarithm of R&D expenditure14. 
𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 is the import penetration ratio in industry j at time t, which is defined as follows: 
                                           𝐼𝑀𝑃𝑗𝑡 =
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡+𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗𝑡−𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡
                                               (5)                                            
where 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡 , 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑗𝑡  and 𝑂𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡𝑗𝑡  are the total imports, exports and outputs of 
industry 𝑗 in time 𝑡. Compared with tariffs, import penetration ratio is argued to be a better 
proxy for trade liberalization, as it takes into account both tariff and non-tariff barriers of 
trade (Levinsohn, 1993).  
𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑡 is our distance proxy, which takes the form of either the industry distance measure 
(𝐼𝐷𝐹𝑗𝑝𝑡) or the firm distance measure (𝐹𝐷𝐹𝑖𝑗𝑡). We also include an interaction term between 
the import penetration ratio and the distance measure in equation (4). The distance-to-frontier 
model suggests that 𝛼1 > 0 and 𝛼2 < 0. Thus, a rise in the industry-level import penetration 
would spur firms’ productivity growth or innovation behavior only if the firm or its industry 
is close to the world technology frontier; by contrast, if the firm or its industry is a long way 
from the frontier, a rising foreign competition through imported goods could reduce firms’ 
innovation incentive and productivity growth. We keep an open view on the coefficient of 𝛼3, 
where 𝛼3 < 0 would indicate the presence of convergence effect, i.e. firms that are far from 
the technology frontier are catching up in terms of productivity growth and innovation 
behavior. 
𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 consists of three groups of control variables, i.e. the firm-specific factors, industry-
specific factors, and China-specific factors. We include four firm-specific characteristics in 
equation (4), i.e. firm age, firm size, capital intensity and firm exit. Firm age (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡) is 
defined as the difference between the current year 𝑡 and the opening year of the firm 𝑖. It is 
included to measure whether younger firms produce with greater efficiency or better 
technology than older ones (a vintage capital effect), or if through learning-by-doing 
productivity increases as the firm ages (see, for instance, Jensen et al., 2001). Firm size 
(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 ) is the natural logarithm of total assets of firm 𝑖  in year 𝑡 , which links with the 
characteristics of the production process in terms of returns to scale (either internal or 
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external to the firm). According to Haltiwanger (2011), static allocative efficiency implies 
that more productive firms are large or becoming larger and less productive firms are small or 
becoming smaller. However, empirical evidence shows that there are large differences in the 
within-industry covariance of size and productivity across countries (Bartelsman et al., 2013). 
Capital intensity (𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡), defined as the natural logarithm of capital stock over 
total employment of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, is another important component in the characterization 
of the production process, which reflects the combination of inputs in the production 
function. Lastly, we control for the exit of firms (𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡) by including a dummy variable equal 
to one if firm 𝑖 exits in the following period. According to Pavcnik (2002), it is important to 
incorporate dynamics like firm exit in the productivity analysis in order to correct for the 
selection problem induced by existing firms. Similarly, using Indonesian data, Amiti and 
Konings (2007) find that firms that exit from the market are on average 4 percent less 
productive than those that remain in the market.  
We construct the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡) as an industry-specific factor, 
aiming at capturing the market structure or the domestic competition status at the 4-digit 
industry level. A lower 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 indicates higher degree of competition in industry 𝑗. Syverson 
(2011) argues that competition drives productivity mainly through two key mechanisms. 
First, competition moves market share toward more efficient firms, i.e. inefficient firms are 
hard to survive in a very competitive market. The second mechanism acts through efficiency 
increases within firms, i.e. intensive competition can induce firms to take costly productivity-
enhancing actions that they may otherwise not. Thus, we hypothesize a negative and 
significant relationship between 𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑗𝑡 and firms’ productivity growth or R&D expenditure in 
equation (4). 
A number of China-specific factors are included in order to capture various sources of 
market frictions such as political economy factors that may affect the mechanisms of the 
model to operate. First, we include the ownership information of firms, which is based on the 
fraction of paid-in-capital contributed by the following six different types of investors: the 
state; foreign investors (excluding those from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan); investors 
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan; legal entities; individuals; and collective investors15. 
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 Investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, and those from other parts of the world are entered 
separately because the former capture the so-called ‘round-tripping’ foreign direct investment, whereby 
domestic firms may register as foreign invested firms from nearby regions to take advantage of the benefits 
(such as tax and legal benefits) granted to foreign invested firms (Huang, 2003). Legal entities comprise 
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We group all foreign firms (from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and other parts of the world) 
into a single foreign category; and all firms owned by legal entities and individuals into a 
single private category16. Thus our firms fall into four broad ownership groups - state-owned 
(𝑆𝑂𝐸), collective (𝐶𝑂𝐿), private (𝑃𝑂𝐸), and foreign (𝐹𝐼𝐸) - based on the shares of paid-in-
capital contributed by the four types of investors each year. We then group firms according to 
the majority average ownership shares. For instance, if the average share of capital paid-in by 
private investors over the sample period is greater than 50%, then the firm is classified as 
privately owned. This approach is argued to be superior to the registration information of 
firms’ ownership, as the latter does not reflect the dynamic nature of firm ownership 
evolution over the sample period.  
Including the foreign ownership information is also crucial to (partly) control for 
another major channel of foreign competition and technology transfer, i.e. FDI. However, we 
find it challenging to completely disentangle the two sources of foreign competition, imports 
and FDI, in China due to the prevalence of processing trade. We therefore make an effort to 
control for the effect of FDI using firms’ foreign share of capital17 when examining the role 
of import competition in driving firms’ productivity and innovation behavior. More 
robustness tests are conducted to further distinguish the competition effect of imports from 
that of FDI in Section 6.     
Second, market effectiveness is argued to have an important role in explaining 
differences on the allocative efficiency among Chinese provinces (Fan et al., 2007; Hsieh and 
Klenow, 2009). Our measure ( 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 ) is the natural logarithm of Fan et al. (2007)’s 
marketization index for different provinces in China, which captures government-market 
relationship, non-state sector development, product market development, factor market 
development, market intermediaries and the legal environment for the market. We expect that 
a more market-oriented environment helps to stimulate firms’ productivity growth and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
industrial enterprises, construction and real estate development companies, transportation and power companies, 
security companies, trust and investment companies, foundations and funds, banks, technology and research 
institutions etc. Collective firms are generally owned collectively by communities in urban or rural areas. The 
latter are known as township and village enterprises (TVEs). 
16
 Within this category, firms owned by individuals make up about two thirds of the total. Firms owned by legal 
entities include firms owned by state legal entities. One could therefore question their inclusion in the private 
category. One reason for including them is that while the state’s primary interest is political (i.e. aimed at 
maintaining employment levels or control over certain strategic industries), legal entities are profit-oriented 
(Wei et al., 2005). Since our dataset does not allow us to discriminate between state and non-state legal entities, 
we are unable to exclude the former from our private category. Our results were generally robust to excluding 
all firms owned by legal entities from the latter category.   
17
 The foreign share definition is similar to that in Javorcik (2004).  
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innovation behavior.  
Lastly, the error term in equation (4) comprises five components: (i) the time-specific 
fixed effect, 𝜂𝑡, accounting for possible business cycles and macroeconomic shocks such as 
an appreciation of the Chinese yuan; (ii) the firm-specific fixed effect, 𝜉𝑖, controlling for any 
time-invariant unobserved firm specific features such as markups; (iii) the industry-specific 
fixed effect, 𝜁𝑗 , reflecting time-invariant industrial features affecting productivity such as 
factor costs and factor intensities; (iv) the province-specific fixed effect, 𝜍𝑝, which captures 
geographic factors that influence productivity such as transportation costs, financial market 
development, tax treatment and so on; and (v) an idiosyncratic error term, 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡, with normal 
distribution 𝜇𝑖𝑗𝑡?̅?(0, 𝜎𝑖𝑗
2 )  to control for other unspecified factors. Our main estimation 
method is panel data fixed effect with standard errors clustered at the firm level. The two-
stage IV approach and system GMM estimator are adopted as alternative methods to address 
the potential endogeneity of regressors.  
5. Data and summary statistics 
5.1 Data and sample 
Our research is based on a number of comprehensive microeconomic datasets, i.e. the 
firm-level production data drawn from the annual survey of Chinese industrial firms by 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the transaction-level trade data from Chinese General 
Administration of Customs (GAC), the US industry-level production data from the NBER 
manufacturing productivity database, and the product-level tariff information published by 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 
The first firm-level dataset is drawn from the annual accounting reports filed by 
industrial firms with the NBS over the period of 1998-2007. This dataset includes all SOEs 
and other types of enterprises with annual sales of five million yuan (about $817,000) or 
more. These firms operate in the manufacturing sectors18 and are located in all 30 Chinese 
provinces or province-equivalent municipal cities 19 . Following the literature, we drop 
observations with negative total assets minus total fixed assets, negative total assets minus 
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 We exclude utilities and mining sectors for our research purpose in this paper. 
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 Our dataset does not contain any firm in Tibet.  
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liquid assets, and negative sales, as well as negative accumulated depreciation minus current 
depreciation. Firms with less than eight employees are also excluded as they fall under a 
different legal regime (see, Brandt et al., 2012). Lastly, to isolate our results from potential 
outliers, we exclude observations in the one percent tails of each of the regression variables.  
The second database from the Chinese Customs contains detailed transaction-level 
information of all imports and exports in China during the period of 2000-06, which includes 
243 trading partners and 7526 different products in the 8-digit Harmonized System (HS). A 
feature of this dataset is its rich information on trade transactions. For instance, for each 
transaction it reports the transaction date, 8-digit HS product code, trade volume, trading 
partner, unit price, shipment method, trade regime and so on. To ensure the accuracy of the 
estimates, we eliminate the trading firms that do not engage in manufacturing but act as 
intermediaries between domestic producers/suppliers and foreign trade partners (see, Ahn et 
al., 2011; Manova and Zhang, 2012; and Yu, 2014)20.  
The construction of our distance variables and their instruments requires the industry-
level production data from the US, which is obtained from the NBER manufacturing 
productivity database (June 2013 version). It contains the annual industry-level data for 459 
4-digit industries over the period of 1958-2009. We manage to match the US industry code 
with the corresponding industry code in China, which gives us a sample of 374 4-digit 
industries in this paper. Lastly, in order to construct the instrument for the import penetration 
variable, we obtain the tariff data from WTO, which provides product-level tariffs at the 6-
digit HS level of all WTO member countries/regions. Following Yu (2014), we use the 
average ad valorem (AV) duty in our empirical regression21.  
5.2 Summary statistics  
We first present some summary statistics of our industry distance measure (𝐼𝐷𝐹). Table 
1 compares the distance value of top and bottom ten 4-digit industries in the year 2000 and 
2006. It is interesting to find out that there is significant dynamics among the industries that 
are close to the world technology frontier over the sample period, i.e. only two light 
industries (manufacture of household air conditioner and manufacture of leather apparel) 
remain in the top-ten list of both 2000 and 2006. Moreover, the average distance in 2006 is 
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merely half of that in 2000, indicating a further shrinkage of the industrial technology 
distance between China and US at the end of the sample period. The composition of these 
close-to-frontier industries changes too, i.e. in 2000, they mainly consist of some light 
industries (such as food processing, leather products etc.); whereas in 2006, some heavy 
industries (such as metal smelting and rolling processing, equipment and machinery 
manufacturing etc.) quickly catch up on the technology level relative to the world frontier. 
This shows some evidence of a more balanced industrial development pattern in China, i.e. 
both heavy and light industries have experienced technology improvement in recent years. 
As for the industries that are far from the frontier, there are at least two trends which 
deserve a mention. First, compared with the world technology frontier, all the bottom ten 
industries have experienced significant technology improvement over the sample period, e.g. 
the maximum distance is 386.6 in 2000, whereas the corresponding figure is reduced to 56.1 
in 2006. Second, compared with other Chinese industries, many industries with low 
technology level in 2000 remain in the bottom-ten list in 2006 (e.g. industries of paper and 
paper products, petroleum processing and coking, and chemical material manufacturing etc.). 
Hence, despite the positive news that these laggard sectors have gradually converged to the 
world technology frontier over time, our data also reveals the sectors with persistent weak 
productivity or technology performance among Chinese industries which may require further 
policy attention.  
At a more aggregate level, we find that the distance-to-frontier measure of most 
industries show a persistent declining trend over the entire sample period and the average 
annual growth rate is -8.1%22. Thus, by constructing our own distance-to-frontier measure, 
we are able to provide some basic answer to the question of whether there is any 
technological upgrading of Chinese manufacturing industries and whether they are catching 
up the world technology frontier. The answer is positive in general but with a great 
heterogeneity among various industries.  
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of variables in the baseline model and the 
sample is split at the median value of the firm distance measure (𝐹𝐷𝐹). Generally speaking, 
firms which are close to the technology frontier have higher TFP growth and spend more on 
the R&D activities; they are younger, larger and more capital intensive; they operate in a 
more competitive and market-oriented environment; and they are mainly non-state firms 
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 See Online Appendix 4 for more information on our distance-to-frontier measure at the 2-digit industry level. 
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(collective, private and foreign firms). On the contrary, we find that firm’s exit rate is higher 
among firms that are distant from the technology frontier, and they are mainly dominant by 
SOEs. From the summary statistics, the import penetration ratio does not show significant 
difference between the two subsamples. It is therefore interesting to explore whether firms’ 
distance to the technology frontier plays a role in shaping the relationship between import 
competition and domestic firms’ productivity improvement and innovation behavior when 
other firm-, industry-, and China-specific features are controlled for. This issue will be 
carefully investigated in the next session by using econometric analysis.      
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Baseline model results 
Table 3 presents the baseline results of equation (4) where the dependent variable is the 
TFP growth. In all columns and for both distance-to-frontier measures (𝐼𝐷𝐹 and 𝐹𝐷𝐹), the 
import penetration ratio has a positive and significant positive effect on TFP growth, whereas 
the effect of an interaction term between the distance measure and import penetration appears 
to be significantly negative. This provides support for the effects highlighted in the theory of 
Aghion et al. (2005), i.e. the positive coefficient on the linear import variable implies that 
import competition tends to stimulate domestic firms’ productivity growth if firms or their 
industries are close to the world frontier (the matching-competition effect); and the negative 
coefficient on the interaction implies that tougher competition from foreign imports is likely 
to discourage firms or industries distant from the frontier from productivity improvement as 
they are too far from the frontier to be able to compete with potential new entrants (the 
discouragement effect). The heterogeneous effects can be further illustrated through elasticity 
discussion. Taking column (1) as an example, the average net elasticity of firms’ TFP growth 
with respect to import competition for industries that are far away from the frontier is -0.08 
(0.185-0.095*2.803), i.e. a 10 percentage point increase in import penetration is associated 
with a 0.8% fall in laggard firms’ productivity growth. On the contrary, for industries close to 
the frontier, a rise in import competition has an opposite effect: a 10 percentage point increase 
in import penetration is associated with a 1.9% increase in firms’ productivity growth. Rather 
than using the mean of the distance measure to compute the average elasticity, Berman et al. 
(2012) propose an alternative method to calculate the elasticity interval by using both the 
maximum and minimum value of the distance measure. Our corresponding elasticity range 
19 
 
for industries distant from the frontier is from -0.38 to 0.09 in column (1). Similar results 
hold when province and industry fixed effects are included and when the firm distance 
measure (𝐹𝐷𝐹) is adopted23. 
 There is no robust evidence for the presence of convergence effect, i.e. the coefficient 
of the distance measure varies when 𝐼𝐷𝐹 and 𝐹𝐷𝐹 are adopted. The coefficients of all other 
control variables are consistent with theoretical predictions. In terms of the firm-specific 
variables, firm age is found to affect TFP growth significantly and negatively, which proves 
the vintage capital effect and rejects the hypothesis that productivity increases as the firm 
ages through learning-by-doing. The positive and significant correlation between firm size 
and productivity growth confirms the view of Haltiwanger (2011) that an important part of 
China’s rapid growing productivity is due to the improvement of allocative efficiency. 
Productivity growth is found to be positively associated with firms’ capital intensity, i.e. firms 
that are more capital intensive tend to have higher TFP growth. Lastly, in line with Pavcnik 
(2002) and Amiti and Konings (2007), we find that firms that dropped out from the market 
have lower productivity growth compared to those that did not.  
The industry-specific 𝐻𝐻𝐼  has a negative effect on TFP growth, indicating that 
intensive competition in the domestic markets can stimulate firms to increase their efficiency 
and productivity. In terms of the China-specific variables, we include three ownership 
dummies (𝑆𝑂𝐸, 𝐶𝑂𝐿 and 𝐹𝐼𝐸) in the estimation. Compared with the omitted default group, 
i.e. the private sector ( 𝑃𝑂𝐸 ), both state and collective firms have significantly lower 
productivity growth, whereas the productivity growth of foreign firms are not significantly 
different from that of private firms. This finding is consistent with the arguments that despite 
decades of economic reform, the state sector remains the least efficient group in the economy, 
with an average return on capital or productivity well below that in the private sector 
(Dougherty and Herd, 2005; Ding et al., 2012). By contrast, foreign firms, with certain cost 
advantages associated with specialized knowledge about production and better management 
or marketing capabilities, and domestic private firms are the most efficient and productive 
sectors in China. It is also interesting to see that the above separation effects of imports are 
evident after controlling for the presence of FDI. Lastly, we find that productivity growth is 
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 Despite the different magnitude of coefficients of key estimates (e.g. IMP and DF*IMP) when IDF and FDF 
are adopted, the elasticity or marginal effects are very similar. For instance, taking column (4) as an example, 
the average net elasticity of firms’ TFP growth with respect to import competition for firms that are far away 
from the frontier is -0.12 (0.448-0.056*10.1), whereas the corresponding figure when industry distance measure 
is adopted is -0.08. We thank one anonymous referee for raising this point.  
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higher in the regions with higher level of market effectiveness.  
The effect of import competition on firms’ R&D expenditure is reported in Appendix 
Table A(5) and we find very similar story to the case of productivity growth. In particular, the 
negative interaction effect counteracts the positive effect of import competition in firms and 
industries that are far away from the frontier. Thus, an increase in foreign competition 
reduces the laggard firms’ incentives to innovate due to the discouragement effect. As firms 
approach the frontier, however, import competition can increase incentives to innovate due to 
the matching-competition effect.   
In brief, our baseline results suggest that import competition drives a productivity and 
innovation wedge between firms that are close to and more distant to the technology frontier, 
consistent with the predictions of the distance-to-frontier model. All firm-, industry- and 
China-specific factors are important to be captured in order to facilitate the efficient operation 
of two separating forces.   
6.2 Robustness tests 
We conduct a number of robustness tests to address the heterogeneous effects of import 
competition in terms of different trade regimes, firm ownerships and origin of imports, to 
further distinguish the two sources of foreign competition (imports and FDI), to deal with the 
potential endogeneity of multiple regressors, and to focus on the long-run growth effects by 
removing the business cycles. To save space, we report the results on productivity growth 
only, and the corresponding results on firms’ R&D expenditure are very similar, which are 
available upon request.    
6.2.1 Processing versus ordinary-trade imports 
There is a rising literature on the effect of various trade regimes (ordinary versus 
processing trade) on firm performance in China, which indicates that generally speaking, 
firms conducting processing trade have inferior performance than their counterparts who are 
engaged in ordinary trade business (see, Jarreau and Poncet, 2012; Manova and Yu, 2012; Yu, 
2014). For instance, Jarreau and Poncet (2012) claim that the growth-enhancing gains of 
trade are limited to the ordinary trade activities undertaken by domestic firms, but not 
processing trade activities. Yu (2014) find that the positive effect of reduction in input and 
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output tariffs on firm productivity is weaker as firms’ processing import share grows. 
Following this line of thinking, we distinguish the heterogeneous effects of imports in 
different trade regimes and expect that the two forces highlighted by the distance-to-frontier 
model may only work for imports under the ordinary trade regime.   
Based on the information from the Customs dataset, we are able to classify all Chinese 
imports into two categories, i.e. processing-trade imports and ordinary-trade imports, which 
are then used to compute the processing-trade import penetration ratio (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑀𝑃) 
and ordinary-trade import penetration ratio (𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑀𝑃). Their effects on productivity 
growth are presented in Table 4. In column (1), the positive coefficient on 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑀𝑃 
and the negative coefficient on the interaction of 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑀𝑃 with the industry distance 
measure (𝐼𝐷𝐹) provide support for the separation effects highlighted in Aghion et al. (2005). 
The average net elasticity of firms’ TFP growth with respect to 𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝐼𝑀𝑃 for industries 
that are far away from the frontier is -0.12 (2.477-0.928*2.803), i.e. a 10 percentage point 
increase in import penetration under the ordinary-trade regime is associated with a 1.2% fall 
in laggard firms’ productivity growth. The corresponding elasticity interval of such firms is 
from -3.1 to 1.5. By contrast, for industries close to the frontier, a 10 percentage point 
increase in import penetration under ordinary-trade regime is associated with a 24.8% 
increase in firms’ productivity growth. Similar results hold in column (4) when the firm 
distance measure (𝐹𝐷𝐹) is adopted. 
Not surprisingly, in column (2), the effect of import penetration under the processing-
trade regime (𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐼𝑀𝑃) does not seem to support the hypothesis of the distance-to-
frontier model and the result is further confirmed in column (3) when both types of import 
penetration are included in the same regression. There is also no consistent evidence when the 
firm distance measure (𝐹𝐷𝐹) is used, i.e. the model seems to work in column (5) but not in 
column (6) when both types of import penetration are simultaneously included in the 
estimation.  
Thus, both the matching-competition effect and the discouragement effect highlighted 
by the model are strongly supported by the ordinary-trade imports but not the processing-
trade imports. The larger marginal effect of ordinary-trade imports compared with the overall 
import penetration ratio in the baseline model also proves that it is the competition brought 
by ordinary-trade imports that makes the model work. Thus, only imports aiming for 
domestic markets are conductive to the productivity enhancement of firms and industries that 
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are close to the frontier, but discouraging productivity improvement of laggard firms and 
industries. Those imports aiming for exporting after local processing have no such effect on 
domestic industries. 
6.2.2 Ownership heterogeneity  
It is argued that a minimum institutional quality is required for the mechanisms of the 
distance-to-frontier model to operate. For instance, Acemoglu et al. (2006) discuss how 
political economy can inhibit the escape-competition effect from operating in their theoretical 
model. Amiti and Khandelwal (2013) claim that the potential for entry and exit of firms is 
crucial for tariffs to invoke more competition in the home market. They also find empirical 
evidence that some countries with weak institutional quality or business environments display 
neither the discouragement nor the escape-competition forces.  
Following this line of thinking, we distinguish the effect of import competition on 
productivity growth across four ownership groups and hypothesize that the model may only 
work for the non-state sectors in China. In Table 5, for both distance measures (𝐼𝐷𝐹 and 
𝐹𝐷𝐹), the matching-competition effect for technologically advanced industries or firms and 
the discouragement effect for laggard industries or firms are only evident for collective firms 
and private firms, but not for SOEs and foreign firms. This indicates that the institutional 
obstacle in the state sector may hinder the two forces of the model to operate. In terms of 
foreign firms, the absence of such effects is not totally unexpected. On the one hand, as 
discussed in the background section, foreign firms play a dominant role in processing trade in 
China, and serve as an exporting platform for foreign countries24. Since foreign firms prefer 
to source inputs from aboard, the effect of foreign imports on their performance should be 
different from the competition pressure faced by the domestic firms. On the other hand, 
foreign-affiliates are less financially constrained due to their access to additional funding 
from their parent company (Manova et al., 2011). Such comparative advantages over local 
firms may also limit the competition pressure brought by foreign imports on their 
performance. 
6.2.3 Import competition from high- and low-income countries  
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 During the period of 1996-2004, foreign firms accounts for 100% of exports out of the export processing 
zones, 95% of processing exports out of high-tech zones, and 67% of processing exports from the rest of China 
(Wang and Wei, 2010). 
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Bloom et al. (2014) develop a general equilibrium model of trade with endogenous 
growth that allows factors of production to be temporarily ‘trapped’ in firms due to specific 
capital or moving costs. The theory predicts that in the face of an import shock from a low-
wage country like China, firms in the affected industry may innovate more due to the fall of 
opportunity cost of innovation and a fall in the shadow cost of trapped factors. The ‘trapped 
factor’ model thus provides an explanation for the phenomenon of trade-induced innovation 
in developed countries, i.e. firms respond to import competition from a low-wage country by 
developing an entirely new type of goods that will be less vulnerable to this type of 
competition. Using a panel of up to half a million firms over 1996-2007 across 12 European 
countries, Bloom et al. (2011) find evidence for the importance of low-wage-country imports 
for technical change in advanced economies. 
It is therefore interesting to explore whether the trapped factor model (or part of it) is 
relevant in understanding the import competition effect in China. For this purpose, we 
classify the countries of origin of imports into two categories by comparing their income 
level with that of China in the beginning of our sample period. Countries with GDP per capita 
higher than China in 2000 are referred to as high-income countries, and those with income 
level lower than China are referred to as low-income countries25 . We then compute the 
corresponding import penetration ratios for these two groups of countries, and refer them to 
High-income IMP and Low-income IMP respectively. We hypothesize that a different 
mechanism may work for China, as firms in developing countries usually operate with 
imperfect knowledge of technological alternatives and finding new technology is sometimes 
difficult and costly. Thus imports through access to capital goods and intermediate goods 
from technologically advanced countries may become a major form of technology transfer 
and a main source of competition that stimulates the competitiveness of domestic industry. 
Table 6 presents the results. It is interesting to find that the separation effects of the 
distance-to-frontier model work only through the channel of imports from high-income 
countries, whereas the exposure to low-income countries does not have any sort of 
productivity-enhancement effects on Chinese firms. This is indeed opposite to the predictions 
of the trapped factor model for the reasons mentioned above. On the other hand, the distance-
to-frontier theory works well for the imports from high-income countries. This is because 
imports from advanced countries are usually characterized by a superior technology and only 
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 The GDP per capita data (constant 2005 US$) is from World Development Indicator (2014 version).  
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firms close to the technology frontier may engage in innovative efforts in order to match such 
foreign competition whereas the innovation incentives of laggard firms and industries are 
dampened. Moreover, openness to trade with advanced economies offers the opportunity to 
exploit higher quality and higher technology intermediates that allow firms to increase their 
efficiency and competitiveness. However only the most productive firms can reap these 
benefits given the high costs involved in the entry in foreign supply markets. Thus, importing 
technology from advanced countries is important for a developing country like China, as 
efficient use of such technology requires creating new skills and knowledge to master its tacit 
elements, which improves domestic productivity.  
6.2.4 Foreign competition from FDI  
Both imports and FDI are important channels of international technology transfer and 
foreign competition. Their contribution to technological progress in a host country can be 
achieved directly through better intermediate inputs and machineries or indirectly through 
knowledge spillover. There is a large literature on the productivity spillover effect of FDI on 
domestic firms in developing countries (see, for instance, Javorcik, 2004; Blalock and 
Gertler, 2007; and Lopez, 2008). In the case of China, Fu (2011) examines the impact of 
processing trade-FDI on domestic firms’ export competitiveness and finds that FDI 
associated with the processing-trade regime has generated little technology transfer for the 
development of competitiveness for indigenous firms. Xu and Sheng (2012) find evidence of 
positive productivity spillovers from FDI, which is mainly operated through forward linkages 
where domestic Chinese firms purchase high-quality intermediate goods or equipment from 
foreign firms in the upstream sectors. Jefferson and Ouyang (2014) investigate the literature 
on FDI spillovers in China and explain the reasons for the extensive difference in empirical 
findings. 
It is therefore important to partial out the foreign competition through FDI when 
analyzing the import competition effects in China. In addition to our efforts of using firms’ 
foreign share of capital to proxy FDI in the baseline model, we adopt an alternative control 
for FDI in Table 7 by using the ratio of foreign investment to total assets as in Fu and Gong 
(2011). We find that FDI intensity significantly contributes to firms’ productivity growth and 
the separation effects predicted by Aghion et al. (2005) still operate well for imports when 
FDI intensity is controlled for.  
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Moreover, when examining the correlation between our two measures of FDI and the 
import penetration variables in Appendix Table A6, we find that FDI is significantly and 
positively correlated with processing-trade import penetration, but not with ordinary-trade 
import penetration in China. Since our results show that the distance-to-frontier model works 
only for imports under the ordinary-trade regime, we can rule out the possibility that FDI is 
the key driver of the separation effects analyzed in the paper.     
6.2.5 Endogeneity  
A number of variables are potentially endogenous in the productivity growth or firm 
innovation regression. First, import penetration may not be exogenously given, but affected 
by firm’s productivity growth or innovation behavior. With better performance, some firms 
may have stronger incentive to expand their business and thus requiring more input from 
abroad and local markets. Second, the distance-to-frontier measure can be endogenous in 
firms’ performance equation, and may capture other industry-specific influences. We first 
adopt an IV estimator to address these concerns. Two sets of instruments are used in our 
analysis. First, following Yu (2014), we use the one-year lag of product-level output tariffs 
obtained from WTO as instruments for the import penetration variable. This is inspired by the 
literature such as Trefler (2004) and Amiti and Konings (2007), where the initial period of 
tariffs are proved to be valid instruments for tariff levels. Second, following Aghion et al. 
(2009), the US industry-level wage and the industry-level capital labor ratio are employed as 
instruments to the distance variable. The results in Table 8 confirm the exogenous role of 
imports in driving the productivity wedge between firms that are close to and more distant to 
the technology frontier.   
Secondly, we use the system GMM estimator (Blundell and Bond, 1998) to estimate 
equation (4). This is particularly useful when other firm-specific variables (such as firm size, 
capital intensity and firm’s exiting behavior) and industry-specific factor (such as 𝐻𝐻𝐼) are 
potentially endogenous. The system GMM estimator can also take into account unobserved 
firm heterogeneity and the possible mismeasurement problems of regressors. In additional to 
the above external instruments, levels of all potentially endogenous regressors lagged three 
times are used as instruments in the first-differenced equations and first-differenced variables 
lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations. The Hansen J test of 
over-identifying restrictions is adopted to evaluate the overall validity of the set of 
instruments. In assessing whether our models are correctly specified and consistent, we are 
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also checking for the presence of second-order autocorrelation in the differenced residuals in 
all estimation. The results are reported in Appendix Table A7. By allowing for endogeneity of 
regressors discussed above, our results confirm the predictions of the distance-to-frontier 
model that industry-level import competition spurs firms’ productivity growth in 
technologically advanced industries and firms, but not in laggard industries and firms. There 
is no evidence of second order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, and the 
Hansen test does not reject the validity of instruments. 
6.2.6 Long-term growth effects  
The distance-to-frontier model originates from the endogenous growth literature and 
has been applied to the cross-country growth regressions by Acemoglu et al. (2006). Despite 
the nature of our micro-level study in a short panel, the ultimate research question is about 
the impact of foreign competition on growth and innovation in China. However, the use of 
annual data may introduce unwanted business cycle effects into the long-term growth 
analysis. In Appendix Table A8, we opt for the non-overlapping three-year intervals in order 
to alleviate such cyclical effects in the estimation. The heterogeneous effects of import 
competition on productivity growth between technologically advanced firms/industries and 
lagging firms/industries are once again confirmed by the data. Thus, our findings that both 
the matching-competition and discouragement forces play a role in shaping the relationship 
between import competition and Chinese firms’ growth performance is not driven by the 
temporary factors associated with business cycles.     
7. Conclusion 
Importing new technologies is viewed as a significant source of productivity and 
economic growth for developing countries, i.e. through adoption and imitation of imported 
technologies, countries can take advantage of R&D abroad to improve the efficiency of 
domestic production. Inspired by such arguments, we investigate the substantial 
heterogeneity of firms’ productivity and innovation reactions to import competition in China. 
We find that Chinese manufacturing sectors have undergone dramatic technological 
upgrading and started to converge to the world technology frontier. After controlling for a 
number of firm-, industry- and China-specific factors, we find that domestic firms that are 
initially close to the world technology frontier benefit the most from foreign competition 
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through imports, whereas for laggard firms that are distant from the frontier, import 
competition appears to dampen their innovation incentive and productivity growth. This 
corresponds well to the theoretical prediction of Aghion et al. (2005) which suggests systemic 
variation of firms’ innovation incentives with their distance to the technology frontier.  
Our research adds a number of new evidence to the economics literature. For instance, 
both the matching-competition effect and discouragement effect hold for imports under the 
ordinary-trade regime, whereas processing-trade imports do not seem to be conducive to 
domestic productivity enhancement or innovation. Controlling for China-specific variables 
such as firm ownerships is crucial for the model to work, and import penetration seems to 
have effects on the competitive pressures faced by domestic non-state firms only. Trade 
openness with advanced economies plays a major role in stimulating Chinese firms’ 
productivity and innovation through the adoption of superior foreign technology.   
Our findings have important implications for the policy debate on trade liberalization, 
competition policy, privatization and reforms in other sectors in China. For instance, fear of 
the initial costs of labor displacement and firm bankruptcies often deters governments from 
exposing their domestic markets to foreign competition. Our study highlights the productivity 
gains of trade openness and suggests that policies aiming at decreasing or removing trade 
barriers alone may not be sufficient to foster productivity growth or innovation behavior of 
domestic firms, i.e. complementary labor and product market reforms are important to 
improve the resource allocation efficiency by reallocating more resources from less to more 
technologically developed sectors where firms respond more positively to import 
competition. A further extension of our study may focus on applying the distance-to-frontier 
model to the analysis of the competition effects of foreign investment or foreign entry on 
domestic industries in China.  
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Table 1. Summary statistics: top and bottom rank of distance to frontier at the 4-digit industry level (2000 versus 2006) 
Top rank Year 
Industry 
code 
Industry name Distance Year 
Industry 
code 
Industry name Distance 
1 2000 3951 Manufacture of household refrigerating appliances 4.92 2006 3322 Smelting of silver 2.83 
2 2000 4051 Manufacture of vacuum electron device 5.32 2006 3331 Smelting of tungsten and molybdenum 3.06 
3 2000 1362 
Production, pickled processing of gefillte fish and 
aquatic 
5.38 2006 3674 
Manufacture of animal husbandry 
machinery 
3.50 
4 2000 3952 Manufacture of household air conditioner 6.40 2006 1931 Tanning of fur 3.64 
5 2000 4071 Manufacture of household video equipment 7.31 2006 1922 Manufacture of leather apparel 3.94 
6 2000 4041 Manufacture of computer machine 7.59 2006 3230 Rolling processing of steel 3.96 
7 2000 2433 Manufacture of electronic musical instruments 7.75 2006 3352 Rolling processing of precious metal 4.26 
8 2000 1922 Manufacture of leather apparel 8.26 2006 3513 
Manufacture of the steam turbine and 
auxiliary machinery 
4.29 
9 2000 1363 Manufacture of aquatic feed 8.48 2006 1910 Tanning of leather 4.41 
10 2000 1361 Aquatic Products Freezing 8.74 2006 3952 








Industry name Distance Year 
Industry 
code 
Industry name Distance 
1 2000 4124 
Manufacture of agriculture, forestry, animal 
husbandry and fishery special instruments 
386.61 2006 4151 Manufacture of film machinery 56.05 
2 2000 4151 Manufacture of film machinery 141.81 2006 2625 
Manufacture of organic fertilizer and 
microbial fertilizer 
53.94 
3 2000 3514 Manufacture of turbines and auxiliary equipment 117.38 2006 1523 Manufacture of yellow rice wine 49.76 
4 2000 2625 
Manufacture of organic fertilizer and microbial 
fertilizer 
107.31 2006 2512 Production of synthetic crude oil 48.53 
5 2000 2512 Production of synthetic crude oil 105.06 2006 2631 Manufacture of chemical pesticide 47.87 
6 2000 3111 Manufacture of cement 94.15 2006 2222 Manufacture of hand-made paper 47.00 
7 2000 3674 Manufacture of animal husbandry machinery 90.89 2006 2824 Manufacture of polyvinyl alcohol fiber 44.04 
8 2000 2631 Manufacture of chemical pesticide 86.74 2006 2750 Manufacture of veterinary drug 42.79 
9 2000 2222 Manufacture of hand-made paper 84.73 2006 4142 Manufacture of glasses 41.58 
10 2000 2622 Manufacture of phosphate fertilizer 84.42 2006 3111 Manufacture of cement 39.00 
Notes: industry code is the 4-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification (CSIC) code. 
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Table 2. Summary statistics: variables in the baseline model 
Variables Close to frontier Far from frontier 
 Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. 
Dependent variables 
      
  TFP Growth 477980 0.021  0.293  467402 0.020  0.276  
  R&D expenditure  444563 0.644  1.917  444545 0.495  1.582  
Independent variables 
      
  Import penetration ratio (IMP) 615191 0.017  0.054  615190 0.018  0.058  
  Industry distance to frontier (IDF) 615191 2.632  0.463  615190 2.974  0.586  
  Firm distance to frontier (FDF) 615191 9.207  0.691  615190 10.994  0.821  
  Firm age (age) 615191 1.899  0.798  615190 2.083  0.956  
  Firm size (size) 615191 10.341  1.238  615190 9.501  1.229  
  Capital intensity (capital intensity) 615191 3.653  1.300  615190 3.131  1.307  
  Firm exit (exit) 615191 0.096  0.294  615190 0.127  0.333  
  Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) 615191 0.013  0.019  615190 0.014  0.020  
  State-owned enterprise (SOE) 615191 0.063  0.244  615190 0.142  0.349  
  Collective enterprise (COL) 615191 0.364  0.481  615190 0.336  0.472  
  Private-owned enterprise (POE) 615191 0.435  0.496  615190 0.414  0.492  
  Foreign-invested enterprise (FIE) 615191 0.149  0.356  615190 0.123  0.328  
  Marketization index (market) 615191 -2.592  0.272  615190 -2.653  0.326  
Notes: the sample is split at the median of the firm distance measure (FDF); the ‘close to frontier’ subgroup consists of firms 
with firm-year observations near the technology frontier (less or equally distant to the frontier as the year-specific median of the 
distance distribution in the sample); and the ‘far from frontier’ subgroup includes firms with firm-year observations further 




Table 3. Baseline results: import competition effects on TFP growth 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.185*** 0.185*** 0.123** 0.448*** 0.449*** 0.548*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.092) (0.092) (0.088) 
DF×IMP -0.095*** -0.095*** -0.039** -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.056*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
DF -0.012*** -0.012*** 0.003 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.028*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.158*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital intensity 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.036*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exit -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.021*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
HHI -0.216*** -0.217*** -0.047 -0.354*** -0.354*** -0.147*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) 
SOE -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
COL -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FIE -0.004 -0.004 -0.004* -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Market 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.052*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Max of DF 5.957 5.957 5.957 14.090 14.090 14.090 
Min of DF 1.041 1.041 1.041 7.015 7.015 7.015 
Mean of DF 2.803 2.803 2.803 10.100 10.100 10.100 
Adj-R
2
 0.027 0.027 0.071 0.092 0.092 0.135 
Observations 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 




Table 4. Import competition effects on TFP growth by trade regimes 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ordinary IMP 2.477***  3.604*** 9.952***  8.715*** 
 (0.956)  (1.051) (1.876)  (2.013) 
DF×Ordinary IMP -0.928***  -1.290*** -0.996***  -0.828*** 
 (0.359)  (0.388) (0.186)  (0.200) 
Processing IMP  -1.698* -3.362***  4.683*** 2.033 
  (0.978) (1.091)  (1.654) (1.782) 
DF×Processing IMP  0.544* 1.082***  -0.564*** -0.316* 
  (0.317) (0.351)  (0.156) (0.169) 
DF 0.003* 0.001 0.003 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adj-R
2
 0.071 0.071 0.071 0.135 0.135 0.136 
Observations 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 
Notes: Ordinary IMP is the ordinary-trade import penetration ratio and Processing IMP is the processing-trade import 
penetration ratio; standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at the firm level; all other control variables 
are included but not reported to save space; all year, firm, province, and industry fixed effects are included; *** p<0.01, ** 




Table 5. Import competition effects on TFP growth across ownership groups 
Dep var:  
TFP growth 

















IMP 0.041 0.222*** 0.238*** 0.056 0.756 0.517*** 0.435** 0.408 
 (0.136) (0.084) (0.092) (0.128) (0.513) (0.176) (0.185) (0.486) 
DF×IMP -0.024 -0.072** -0.081** -0.009 -0.072 -0.052*** -0.045** -0.043 
 (0.046) (0.030) (0.033) (0.047) (0.060) (0.017) (0.019) (0.048) 
DF 0.006 0.001 0.000 0.006 0.123*** 0.142*** 0.154*** 0.106*** 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Max of DF 5.957 4.954 4.798 4.792 14.090 14.089 14.090 14.088 
Min of DF 1.041 1.041 1.040 1.039 7.014 7.013 7.015 7.014 
Mean of DF 3.029 2.833 2.748 2.740 10.851 10.058 10.021 9.913 
Adj-R
2
 0.066 0.073 0.076 0.080 0.134 0.142 0.144 0.125 
Observations 109460 338346 379415 129242 109460 338346 379415 129242 
 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at the firm level; all other control variables are included but not reported to save space; all 






Table 6.  Import competition effects on TFP growth by origin of imports 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
High-income IMP 0.115*  0.085* 0.412***  0.464*** 
 (0.064)  (0.048) (0.109)  (0.124) 
DF×High-income IMP -0.068***  -0.059** -0.051***  -0.058*** 
 (0.023)  (0.026) (0.011)  (0.012) 
Low-income IMP  0.829 -0.105  -2.278 -3.686 
  (1.725) (1.714)  (2.411) (2.375) 
DF×Low-income IMP  -0.409 0.006  0.192 0.369 
  (0.598) (0.588)  (0.239) (0.233) 
DF 0.004* 0.002 0.004* 0.136*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Adj-R
2
 0.071 0.070 0.071 0.135 0.135 0.135 
Observations 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 
Notes: High-income IMP is the import penetration ratio of imports from high-income countries and Low-income IMP is the 
import penetration ratio of imports from low-income countries; the high- and low-income country classification is made by 
comparing the GDP per capita in 2000 (constant 2005 US$, data from World Development Indicator) between China and other 
countries, i.e. countries with GDP per capita higher than China are referred to as high-income countries, and those with GDP 
per capita lower than China are referred to as low-income countries; standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are 
clustered at the firm level; all other control variables are included but not reported to save space; all year, firm, province, and 




Table 7. Import competition effects on TFP growth (an alternative control for FDI) 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.173*** 0.174*** 0.118** 0.465*** 0.467*** 0.556*** 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.048) (0.093) (0.093) (0.089) 
DF×IMP -0.089*** -0.089*** -0.036** -0.057*** -0.057*** -0.056*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
DF -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.003* 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FDI 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.033*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj-R
2
 0.027 0.027 0.070 0.092 0.092 0.134 
Observation 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 
Notes: FDI is the FDI intensity measured by the ratio of foreign investment to total assets as in Fu and Gong (2011); the three 
ownership variables are dropped to avoid multi-collinearity; standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at 






Table 8. Import competition effects on TFP growth using two-stage IV estimation 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.105** 0.105** 0.032 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.227*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.043) (0.063) (0.063) (0.056) 
DF×IMP -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.009 -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.015) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
DF -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj-R
2 
0.070 0.070 0.173 0.139 0.139 0.240 
Observation 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 
Notes: the one-year lag of product-level output tariffs obtained from WTO are used as instruments for the import penetration 
variable (IMP); the US industry-level wage and capital labor ratio are employed as instruments to the distance variable (DF); 
standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at the firm level; all other control variables are included but not 





Figure 1. Innovation and competition: the inverted-U relationship 
 
 
Notes: this figure plots a measure of competition on the x-axis against a measure of innovation (the citation-
weighted patents) on the y-axis. Each-point represents an industry-year. The circles show an exponential 
quadratic curve and the triangles show a nonparametric spine.  
Source: Aghion et al. (2005). 
 
 
Figure 2. China’s trade liberalization: imports, exports and import penetration 
 
 
Notes: exports and imports are in absolute term to reflect trade volumes; import penetration ratio is the ratio of 
imports to the gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for the foreign trade balance (difference between exports 
and imports) in order to reflect the importance of imports in the domestic economy. 
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Figure 3. China’s imports by trade regimes  
 
Notes: Ordinary imports refer to imports under the ordinary trade regime; processing imports refer to imports under 
the processing trade regime, which consist of ‘pure assembly trade’ and ‘processing with imported materials trade’; 
other types of imports include imports under ‘consignment trade’, ‘compensatory trade’, ‘small-amount border 
trade’, ‘exports of foreign contracted projects’, ‘barter trade’, ‘tax-free merchandise (goods) sold (bought) in 
foreign currencies’, ‘inbound and outbound goods in bonded warehouse’, ‘storage of transit goods in bonded 
warehouse’ , ‘goods from non-rewarded assistance and donation from other countries and international 
organizations’ and other types of trade. 
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Figure 4. China’s imports by countries of origin 
 
Notes: the high- and low-income country classification is made by comparing the GDP per capita in 2000 
(constant 2005 US$, data from World Development Indicator) between China and other countries, i.e. countries 
with GDP per capita higher than China are referred to as high-income countries, and those with GDP per capita 
lower than China are referred to as low-income countries; the import penetration ratio is then computed for these 
two groups of countries. The import share from high-income countries is the ratio between import volumes from 
high-income countries and the total import volumes in China. 
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Figure 5. China’s imports by ownerships  
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Online Appendix 1. Industry-level import penetration information 
The industry-level import penetration ratio is also important as it reflects a country’s 
industrial and trade structure. Using our own micro-level data, we compute the import penetration 
ratio in 2-digit Chinese industrial sectors during the period of 2000-06 in Appendix Table A1. It is 
interesting to see that there exist significant cross-sectional and time-series variations. For instance, 
the important penetration ratio is high and rising for a number of sectors producing industrial goods 
(such as electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing; electronic and communication 
equipment manufacturing etc.), but the ratio is low and declining for sectors producing primary 
goods and labor-intensive products (such as food processing, beverage manufacturing, and textile 
etc.). This pattern corresponds well to the fact that China is a big net importer of intermediate 
capital- and skill-intensive goods, and a big net exporter of primary and final labor-intensive 
products, which is consistent with the predictions of the comparative advantage argument. The 
significant heterogeneity of industry-level import penetration ratio may also indicate different levels 
of protection across sectors in China, i.e. high tariffs in sectors like food and beverages but low 
tariffs in other sectors such as electronic equipment.   
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Table A1. Import penetration ratio in 2-digit Chinese industrial sectors (2000-06) 
 
Industry code Industry name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
13 Food processing industry 0.075 0.066 0.068 0.075 0.076 0.056 0.052 
14 Food manufacturing industry 0.037 0.040 0.035 0.032 0.032 0.025 0.023 
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 
16 Tobacco processing industry 0.015 0.017 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.019 0.022 
17 Textile industry 0.126 0.123 0.101 0.092 0.075 0.061 0.049 
18 Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 0.049 0.046 0.040 0.039 0.040 0.030 0.026 
19 Leather, fur, down and down products industry 0.079 0.066 0.072 0.064 0.068 0.049 0.043 
20 Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber and straw products industry 0.129 0.087 0.086 0.090 0.070 0.048 0.031 
21 Furniture manufacturing industry 0.060 0.075 0.076 0.104 0.099 0.069 0.058 
22 Paper and paper products industry 0.173 0.157 0.144 0.133 0.11 0.088 0.073 
23 Printing and record medium reproduction industry 0.032 0.033 0.029 0.026 0.026 0.025 0.024 
24 Educational and sports goods industry 0.290 0.312 0.339 0.348 0.371 0.359 0.325 
25 Petroleum processing and coking industry 0.033 0.03 0.138 0.148 0.161 0.158 0.184 
26 Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 0.317 0.331 0.317 0.324 0.319 0.297 0.271 
27 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 0.061 0.073 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.068 0.065 
28 Manufacture of chemical fibers industry 0.153 0.164 0.158 0.143 0.127 0.102 0.072 
29 Rubber product industry 0.076 0.084 0.076 0.102 0.103 0.094 0.111 
30 Plastic products industry 0.131 0.126 0.120 0.128 0.126 0.125 0.115 
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 0.045 0.046 0.043 0.043 0.041 0.035 0.030 
32 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.131 0.129 0.143 0.148 0.116 0.111 0.088 
33 Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.225 0.227 0.209 0.216 0.193 0.193 0.160 
34 Fabricated metal products industry 0.132 0.135 0.134 0.134 0.145 0.123 0.114 
35 General machinery manufacturing industry 0.353 0.377 0.362 0.373 0.355 0.313 0.283 
36 Special equipment manufacturing industry 0.371 0.452 0.421 0.426 0.404 0.368 0.329 
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing industry 0.114 0.177 0.142 0.171 0.15 0.145 0.172 
39 Weapons and ammunition industry 0.033 0.034 0.050 0.037 0.034 0.031 0.028 
40 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.464 0.511 0.607 0.686 0.858 0.903 1.079 
41 Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 0.494 0.555 0.573 0.702 0.746 0.737 0.705 
42 Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 0.152 0.148 0.122 0.113 0.114 0.090 0.075 
Notes: industry code is the 2-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification (CSIC) code. 
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Online Appendix 2. TFP estimation: methods and results 
We construct the measure of firm-level TFP using the semi-parametric Olley and Pakes 
(1996) approach which alleviates both the selection bias and simultaneity bias (between input 
choices and productivity shocks). Another advantage of Olley-Pakes method is the flexible 
characterization of productivity, only assuming that it evolves according to a Markov process (Van 
Biesebroeck, 2007). Thus, assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the production function 
is  
                             𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑘 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡                                     
where 𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡  , 𝑘𝑖𝑗𝑡 , and 𝑙𝑖𝑗𝑡  refer to the natural logarithm of value added
1, capital input2 and labor 
input3 of firm i in industry j at time t; 𝑤𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a productivity difference known to the firm, 
but unobservable to us; and 𝜀𝑖𝑗𝑡 is either measurement error or a shock to productivity which is not 
forecastable during the period in which labor can be adjusted.   
Our approach is based on the recent development in the application of the Olley-Pakes 
method (for instance, Amiti and Konings, 2007; Brandt et al., 2012; Feenstra et al., 2013). First, we 
use different price deflators for inputs, outputs and investment. It is known in the productivity 
literature that ideally one would use firm-specific price deflators when constructing TFP. Since such 
information is not available in the data, we use different industry-specific price deflators for inputs, 
outputs and investment, which are directly drawn from Brandt et al. (2012). This implies that our 
TFP measure is a revenue-based productivity measure (TFPR) as introduced by Foster et al. (2008), 
which may capture both technical efficiency and price-cost markups. Following Pavcnik (2002), we 
control for firm-specific markups with firm fixed effects in the estimation. Second, we use the 
perpetual inventory method to compute the real investment variable, where the depreciation rate of 
physical capital is based on firms’ reported actual depreciation figure rather than arbitrary 
assumptions. Appendix Table A2 reports the estimated coefficients of the production function and 
the associated log of TFP by industry.   
 
  
                                                        
1
 The value added is defined as sales minus intermediate inputs plus value added tax. 
2
 Capital input is computed using the perpetual inventory method following Brandt et al. (2012).  
3
 Labor input is total employment.  
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Table A2. TFP Estimates using Olley-Pakes approach 
Industry code Industry name Capital Std. Dev. Labor Std. Dev. TFP 
13 Food processing industry 0.464*** 0.014  0.497*** 0.009  4.009  
14 Food manufacturing industry 0.641*** 0.021  0.593*** 0.011  4.120  
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 0.628*** 0.037  0.481*** 0.017  5.174  
16 Tobacco processing industry 0.625*** 0.128  0.386*** 0.072  8.517  
17 Textile industry 0.403*** 0.013  0.415*** 0.007  3.393  
18 Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 0.357*** 0.012  0.542*** 0.008  4.076  
19 Leather, fur, down and down products industry 0.344*** 0.017  0.504*** 0.013  4.386  
20 Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber and straw products industry 0.451*** 0.027  0.455*** 0.015  3.754  
21 Furniture manufacturing industry 0.429*** 0.051  0.681*** 0.015  3.922  
22 Paper and paper products industry 0.503*** 0.043  0.376*** 0.011  4.171  
23 Printing and record medium reproduction industry 0.814*** 0.026  0.396*** 0.015  4.495  
24 Educational and sports goods industry 0.259*** 0.061  0.523*** 0.016  3.424  
25 Petroleum processing and coking industry 0.351*** 0.072  0.355*** 0.028  3.950  
26 Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 0.458*** 0.036  0.362*** 0.009  3.677  
27 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 0.534*** 0.019  0.370*** 0.017  4.489  
28 Manufacture of chemical fibers industry 0.505*** 0.054  0.361*** 0.029  5.157  
29 Rubber product industry 0.472*** 0.043  0.392*** 0.019  4.159  
30 Plastic products industry 0.475*** 0.056  0.389*** 0.009  3.431  
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 0.618*** 0.015  0.284*** 0.008  3.434  
32 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.466*** 0.021  0.459*** 0.012  4.136  
33 Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 0.382*** 0.047  0.434*** 0.023  4.193  
34 Fabricated metal products industry 0.425*** 0.018  0.440*** 0.008  3.718  
35 General machinery manufacturing industry 0.492*** 0.015  0.391*** 0.011  4.080  
36 Special equipment manufacturing industry 0.674*** 0.019  0.400*** 0.012  3.258  
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing industry 0.631*** 0.032  0.507*** 0.009  4.050  
39 Weapons and ammunition industry 0.467*** 0.022  0.452*** 0.008  4.212  
40 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 0.453*** 0.028  0.509*** 0.010  4.392  
41 Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 0.528*** 0.054  0.418*** 0.018  3.866  
42 Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 0.353*** 0.019  0.469*** 0.012  3.596  
Notes: industry code is the 2-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification (CSIC) code; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Online Appendix 3. Dataset merging techniques and outcomes 
The difficulty of merging the NBS and Customs datasets lies in the absence of a common 
firm identifier shared by both datasets. We therefore rely on other firm characteristics such as firm 
name, telephone number, zip code, and firm address to achieve the best possible match of two 
datasets. Appendix Table A3(a) presents a brief summary of the datasets. We find that the number of 
exporting firms in the NBS dataset is much smaller than that in the Customs dataset4. There are two 
explanations for this discrepancy. First, most trading firms are quite small, so that they are not 
included in the ‘above-scale’ NBS dataset (Yu, 2014). Second, the NBS dataset covers 
manufacturing firms only, whereas the Customs dataset consists of trading firms in all sectors in 
China such as manufacturing, agriculture, service, and so on. During the period of 2000-06, the 
number of exporting firms in our merged dataset accounts for 58.5% of total exporting firms in the 
NBS dataset on average. 
We also compute the representativeness of our merged sample compared with the full-sample 
NBS data. Appendix Table A3(b) shows how much of total sales, exports and employment are 
accounted for by the merged data each year during 2000-06. On average, our merged data covers 
44% of total sales, 74% of total exports and 36.4% of total employment in the firm-level NBS data. 
Appendix Table A3(c) shows that our merged sample has higher means of sales, exports and 
number of employees than the corresponding figures in the full-sample NBS data. These findings 
suggest that the merged sample is skewed toward large manufacturing firms in China.   
  
                                                        
4
 Note that although Customs dataset includes both imports and exports information, the NBS dataset contains firms’ 
exporting information only.  
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Table A3(a). Basic summary of datasets 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
NBS data 
a 
119,444 131,437 145,464 163,332 238,078 237,116 263,158 
##Export 36,908 40,128 45,040 50,616 76,607 74,395 77,723 
Customs data 
b 
81,995 89,660 104,245 124,299 153,779 179,666 208,425 
  ##Export 62,746 68,487 78,612 95,688 120,590 144,030 171,205 
##Import 62,750 67,588 77,303 87,934 102,242 113,456 121,835 
Merged data 
c 
25,712 29,615 33,918 39,020 56,937 57,058 60,999 
##Export 19,104 21,914 25,683 30,611 44,790 46,372 50,211 
##Import 18,094 20,041 22,700 25,787 36,943 36,332 38,102 
Merge Ratio 
d 
51.76% 54.61% 57.02% 60.48% 58.47% 62.33% 64.60% 
 
Notes: (a) The NBS firm-level dataset includes above-scale firms in the manufacturing sectors in China; it also reports 
firms’ export sales, but there is no information on imports; (b) The Customs dataset contains detailed product-level 
information of international trade (both exports and imports) at the monthly level; we therefore aggregate such 
information to the firm-year level in order to merge it with the NBS dataset; (c) The merge of the two dataset is mainly 
based on the firm name, and other firm characteristics such as telephone number, zip code and firm address; (d) The 
merge ratio is computed as the number of exporting firms in the merged dataset in relation to the number of total 
exporting firms in the NBS dataset. 
 
 
Table A3(b). Firm-level production information in merged vs. full-sample NBS data by year  
Variables  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average 
Sales (%) 41.19 43.08 43.88 45.54 45.98 44.95 43.47 44.01 
Exports (%) 68.55 71.05 72.94 74.47 77.10 76.67 77.42 74.03 
Number of Employees (%) 30.31 33.05 35.15 37.29 39.14 39.94 39.90 36.40 
 
Notes: the value in this table represents the percentages of total sales, exports and employment of the merged data in the 




Table A3(c). Comparison of the merged data and the full-sample NBS data  
Variables Full-sample data Merged data 
 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max 
Sales (RMB 1,000) 68717.90 5001 9993990 135093.9 5001 9987010 
Exports (RMB 1,000) 17196.51 0 1.52E+08 57453.14 0 1.52e+08 




Online Appendix 4. More information on our distance-to-frontier measure 
Table A4. Summary statistics: distance to frontier at the 2-digit industry level (2000-2006) 
Industry code Industry name 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Growth (%) 
13 Food processing industry 16.30 15.57 14.47 13.23 11.63 9.82 8.38 -9.50 
14 Food manufacturing industry 23.50 22.60 21.43 18.82 17.16 13.98 11.49 -10.22 
15 Beverage manufacturing industry 26.68 24.06 24.13 26.34 22.97 21.21 17.23 -6.25 
16 Tobacco processing industry 36.04 31.81 19.23 15.30 12.96 14.53 11.68 -16.10 
17 Textile industry 17.65 16.06 15.95 14.68 13.50 11.83 10.43 -7.51 
18 Clothing and other fiber products manufacturing 15.60 16.02 17.74 16.70 16.12 14.55 13.56 -2.00 
19 Leather, fur, down and down products industry 16.76 14.85 15.16 14.82 15.96 14.16 12.59 -4.09 
20 Timber processing, bamboo, cane, palm fiber and straw products industry 13.85 12.30 12.03 13.68 13.32 10.49 8.46 -7.04 
21 Furniture manufacturing industry 14.61 14.17 15.05 15.61 15.47 14.13 12.34 -2.41 
22 Paper and paper products industry 33.79 29.18 27.26 22.92 22.60 18.24 16.89 -9.91 
23 Printing and record medium reproduction industry 17.00 14.02 13.21 12.49 11.74 10.93 9.46 -8.37 
24 Educational and sports goods industry 28.53 26.00 30.81 30.28 31.27 28.94 25.78 -1.45 
25 Petroleum processing and coking industry 31.43 24.31 17.21 18.99 21.36 32.08 28.44 -1.43 
26 Chemical materials and chemical products manufacturing industry 47.48 34.91 34.33 27.77 25.88 25.62 21.72 -11.17 
27 Pharmaceutical manufacturing industry 49.17 48.36 45.42 47.12 42.81 36.54 33.60 -5.44 
28 Manufacture of chemical fibers industry 16.24 21.27 17.77 13.48 15.92 14.49 13.37 -2.78 
29 Rubber product industry 24.03 19.71 16.97 15.33 16.34 12.81 10.48 -11.85 
30 Plastic products industry 14.49 12.76 12.02 14.38 12.02 12.27 11.05 -3.87 
31 Non-metallic mineral products industry 30.95 27.35 26.02 22.01 19.12 16.68 13.97 -11.36 
32 Ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 16.16 12.98 12.29 8.53 7.73 6.69 6.09 -13.94 
33 Non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry 21.05 16.04 15.81 11.86 11.33 8.73 6.55 -16.68 
34 Fabricated metal products industry 16.92 15.05 14.73 13.09 12.93 11.33 9.89 -7.67 
35 General machinery manufacturing industry 25.73 22.11 20.33 16.33 13.92 12.04 10.55 -12.74 
36 Special equipment manufacturing industry 36.79 27.96 25.75 22.43 18.48 16.95 13.98 -13.82 
37 Transportation equipment manufacturing industry 24.67 18.92 17.63 15.18 13.86 12.87 10.80 -11.80 
39 Weapons and ammunition industry 17.94 14.70 15.08 14.31 14.37 13.01 11.00 -6.99 
40 Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing 16.95 11.78 11.64 12.11 14.41 13.93 12.44 -4.42 
41 Electronic and communication equipment manufacturing industry 30.42 22.06 19.74 18.15 18.29 15.90 14.00 -11.09 
42 Instrumentation and culture, office machinery manufacturing industry 22.53 20.88 21.14 20.64 22.51 20.39 16.95 -4.07 
Notes: industry code is the 2-digit Chinese Standard Industrial Classification (CSIC) code; the growth (%) is the annual average growth rate of distance to frontier over the period 
2000-06, i.e. (ln(2006 distance)-ln(2000 distance))/7.
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Online Appendix 5. More robustness tests 
Table A5. Baseline results: import competition effects on R&D expenditure 
Dep var: ln(R&D) 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.866*** 0.867*** 0.818*** 1.205** 1.206** 1.224** 
 (0.312) (0.312) (0.313) (0.549) (0.549) (0.549) 
DF×IMP -0.310*** -0.310*** -0.287*** -0.118** -0.118** -0.119** 
 (0.110) (0.110) (0.111) (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
DF -0.018* -0.018* -0.023** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Size 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.191*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Capital intensity 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 0.029*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Exit -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.068*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
HHI -0.249 -0.248 -0.250 -0.281 -0.280 -0.246 
 (0.201) (0.201) (0.208) (0.200) (0.200) (0.207) 
SOE -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.118*** -0.120*** -0.120*** -0.120*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
COL -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
FIE -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 -0.015 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Market -0.035 -0.027 -0.035 -0.012 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Max of DF 5.957 5.957 5.957 14.090 14.090 14.090 
Min of DF 1.041 1.041 1.041 7.015 7.015 7.015 
Mean of DF 2.803 2.803 2.803 10.100 10.100 10.100 
Adj-R
2
 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 
Observations 889113 889113 889113 889113 889113 889113 
 





Table A6. Correlation between import penetration and FDI 
 
Panel A: 2000 
 IMP Ordinary IMP Processing IMP FIE FDI 
IMP 1.0000     
Ordinary IMP 0.8078* 1.0000    
Processing IMP 0.5119* 0.2522* 1.0000   
FIE -0.0011    -0.0431 0.1738* 1.0000  
FDI 0.1919* 0.0990 0.3171* 0.7689* 1.0000 
 
Panel B: 2003 
 IMP Ordinary IMP Processing IMP FIE FDI 
IMP 1.0000     
Ordinary IMP 0.8129* 1.0000    
Processing IMP 0.4628* 0.1849* 1.0000   
FIE 0.0066 -0.0829 0.2125* 1.0000  
FDI 0.1116* 0.0278 0.2228* 0.7896* 1.0000 
 
Panel C: 2006 
 IMP Ordinary IMP Processing IMP FIE FDI 
IMP 1.0000     
Ordinary IMP 0.8078* 1.0000    
Processing IMP 0.3571* 0.2031* 1.0000   
FIE 0.0966 -0.1216* 0.1717* 1.0000  
FDI 0.0966 0.0105 0.1961* 0.7909* 1.0000 
 
Notes: IMP is the import penetration ratio; Ordinary IMP is the ordinary-trade import penetration ratio; Processing 
IMP is the processing-trade import penetration ratio; FIE is the first proxy for FDI, measured as the firms’ foreign 
share of capital as in Javorcik (2004); and FDI is the second proxy for FDI, measured as the ratio of foreign investment 




Table A7. Import competition effects on TFP growth using system GMM estimation 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.423*** 0.405*** 0.403*** 0.788*** 0.877*** 0.872*** 
 (0.117) (0.116) (0.112) (0.249) (0.259) (0.255) 
DF×IMP -0.545*** -0.539*** -0.538*** -0.311*** -0.310** -0.309** 
 (0.205) (0.193) (0.195) (0.103) (0.101) (0.099) 
DF 0.022*** 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Age -0.026*** -0.021*** -0.015*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.021*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Size 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Capital intensity 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.016*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exit -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.004*** -0.019*** -0.010*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
HHI -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.016*** -0.023*** -0.017*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001) 
SOE -0.031*** -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.035*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
COL -0.003 -0.005** -0.004 -0.002 -0.004* -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
FIE 0.018*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.018*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Max of DF 5.957 5.957 5.957 14.090 14.090 14.090 
Min of DF 1.041 1.041 1.041 7.015 7.015 7.015 
Mean of DF 2.803 2.803 2.803 10.100 10.100 10.100 
AR(2) p-value 0.21 0.29 0.22 0.44 0.31 0.27 
Hansen J p-value 0.17 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.22 
Observation 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 945387 
 





Table A8. Import competition effects on long-term TFP growth (3-year effects) 
Dep var: TFP growth 
Industry distance measure (IDF) Firm distance measure (FDF) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
IMP 0.105** 0.105** 0.032** 0.172*** 0.172*** 0.227*** 
 (0.050) (0.050) (0.015) (0.063) (0.063) (0.056) 
DF×IMP -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.009*** -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
DF -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.057*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Age -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Size 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.091*** 0.091*** 0.090*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Capital intensity 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Exit -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
HHI -0.109*** -0.109*** 0.005 -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.016 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.029) (0.039) (0.039) (0.028) 
SOE -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003* -0.003 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
COL 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
FIE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Market 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.069*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes 
Max of DF 5.957 5.957 5.957 14.090 14.090 14.090 
Min of DF 1.041 1.041 1.041 7.015 7.015 7.015 
Mean of DF 2.803 2.803 2.803 10.100 10.100 10.100 
Adj-R
2
 0.070 0.070 0.173 0.139 0.139 0.240 
Observations 358547 358547 358547 358547 358547 358547 
 
Notes: standard errors are reported in parentheses, which are clustered at the firm level; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
